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IMAGINING A FREE PRESS
Geoffrey R. Stone*

IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS. By Lee c. Bollinger. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 209. $22.50.
No thoughtful person can be satisfied with the current state of our
political process. Effective political communication is too expensive.
Money and incumbency play too large a role in the process. Citizens
have little or no access to unorthodox or radical points of view. Political debate is superficial; we are mired in an era of politics - and
government - by sound bite. The press self-indulges in the virtually
unrestrained disclosure of gossip and ~uendo about the private lives
of political candidates and routinely treats political campaigns as
sporting events, denigrating the candidates and the process alike.
Although the causes of these problems are complex, there can be
little doubt that at least some share of the responsibility belongs to the
press. What can we do to improve its performance? To what extent
does the Constitution, and particularly the freedom of the press guarantee of the First Amendment, preclude government regulation
designed to redress the press' failures? The First Amendment was
adopted at least in part to ensure a well-functioning democratic process. Does the First Amendment today promote or hinder that goal?
In Images of a Free Press, Dean Lee C. Bollinger1 aspires "to enlarge our vision of the idea of freedom of the press" (p. xii) with an eye
toward enabling government to improve the quality of public debate.
Revisiting themes he first explored some fifteen years ago, 2 Bollinger
now adds further to our understanding of the complex relationship
among the First Amendment, the Supreme Court, the public, the press
and the democratic process. This is a work of insight, sensitivity, and
power. Bollinger has a profound knowledge of and a deep affection for
his subject, and it shows.
I
Dean Bollinger's analysis can be divided into six separate steps. I
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, University of Chicago Law School. B.S.
1968, Pennsylvania; J.D. 1971, University of Chicago. - Ed. I would like to thank Anne-Marie
Burley, Abner Greene, Larry Lessig, David Strauss, Elena Kagan, and Cass Sunstein for their
helpful comments on an earlier version of this review.
1. Dean, University of Michigan Law School.
2. Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory ofPartial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 15 MICH. L. RE.v. 1 (1976).
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will consider each in turn. Bollinger begins with what he describes as
the "central image" of freedom of the press in the United States today.
According to Bollinger, this image received itS richest articulation in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 3 in which the Court identified a fundamental conflict in our constitutional scheme: The primary function
of freedom of the press is to support the societal choice for a democratic form of government, but the very government that is established
in this scheme will inevitably attempt to suppress speech that threatens its power. In Bollinger's view, Sullivan structured the "central
image" of press freedom around this basic insight. The critical features of this image are that (a) "the government is untrustworthy
when it regulates public debate"; (b) the citizens are "the ultimate sovereign"; (c) "open debate must be preserved for their benefit"; and (d)
"the press is the public's representative . . . helping stand guard
against the atavistic tendencies of the state" (p. 20). Bollinger notes
that the consequence of this central image is that ''whenever public
regulation touches the press the alarm will be sounded. And the now
conventional cry will issue that, when it comes to the .press, the government must keep its hands off" (p. 21). In a long series of decisions
since Sullivan, the Court has consistently reinforced and reaffirmed
this "autonomy-based" conception of press freedom. 4
This "central image" of freedom of the press is the book's primary
target. Bollinger's core theme is that the reality of press freedom in
the United States is significantly more complex than this conception
indicates and that what is needed is "a more sophisticated model of
quality public debate, in which there is some room for public institutions to . . . help moderate tendencies . . . that distort and bias the
process of public discussion and decision making" (p. 23).
Bollinger is clearly accurate in his description of the "central image." He is on less solid ground, however, in tracing this image so
emphatically to Sullivan. The Court's protection of press freedom did
not begin with Sullivan. To the contrary, the Court had forcefully
articulated a similar, though less complete, vision of press freedom
much earlier, in cases like Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 5 and Grosjean v. American Press Co. 6 Moreover, and more important, the "central image" that Bollinger ascribes to Sullivan really has nothing to do
with freedom of the press, as such. Rather, it is essentially a restate3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Minnesota Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commr. of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (taxation); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (free press/fair trial);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (privacy); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) Qibel); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rightof-reply); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (national security).
5. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
6. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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ment, with minor modification, of the central image of freedom of
speech. This image originates, not in Sullivan, but in the dissenting
opinions of Justice Holmes in Abrams 7 and Gitlow, 8 in Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney, 9 and in a host of other decisions
involving freedom of speech, such as Lovell v. City of Griffin, 10 Terminiello v. Chicago, 11 and Cantwell v. Connecticut. 12
Indeed, Sullivan itself was not about freedom of the press, as distinct from freedom of speech. It did not articulate a new "image" of
press freedom; it drew upon and strengthened a tradition of freedom
of speech and press that was already deeply rooted in our general First
Amendment jurisprudence. Sullivan's skepticism about government
regulation of expression, which is so central to Bollinger's "central image" of freedom of the press, derives from our general free speech tradition and not from any special concerns about the press. Moreover,
although Bollinger sees Sullivan as a decision about freedom of the
press, the Court both before and after Sullivan has consistently and
with good reason resisted the invitation to embrace a separate and distinct conception of press freedom - for otherwise, the Court would
have had to determine whether Abrams' flyers, Gitlow's manifesto,
Lovell's leaflets, and Cantwell's phonograph constituted "speech" or
"press" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and something
of consequence would have had to tum on the outcome of this not
very promising inquiry.
This is not a trivial point. In Images of a Free Press, Dean Bollinger asks us to jettison Sullivan's "central image" of press freedom and
to replace it with "a more sophisticated model of quality public debate, in which there is some room for public institutions to ... help
moderate tendencies . . . that distort and bias the process of public
discussion and decision making" (p. 23). But if this "central image" is
critical, not only to freedom of the press but to freedom of speech
generally, then Bollinger is asking us to reconsider the entire corpus of
First Amendment jurisprudence. After all, if we can trust government
to regulate the press in order to improve the "quality of public debate," we can trust it to regulate speech as well. By targeting Sullivan
as the root of the problem, and by defining freedom of the press as a
right separate and distinct from freedom of speech, Bollinger creates
the impression that he is tinkering with only one comer of the First
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, q24-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (anti-war
protest).
8. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (subversive
advocacy).
9. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (subversive
advocacy).
10. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) Qicensing).
11. 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (hostile audience).
12. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (hostile audience).
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Amendment. But the questions Bollinger asks us to consider about
the legitimacy of the "central image" cannot be so easily cabined. In
fact, the stakes may be a good deal higher than Bollinger admits.
II

Dean Bollinger next considers the costs of an autonomous press,
and finds two of these costs to be prohibitively high. First, Bollinger
argues that the Court has purchased press autonomy at too high a
price in terms of the sacrifice of competing interests and that the Court
has systematically undervalued the importance of such interests in order to justify its results. As an illustration, Bollinger offers Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 13 in which the Court held that the state lacks a
substantial interest in prohibiting the press from disclosing the identity
of a rape victim once her identity has been made public in any way by
officers of the state. Second, Bollinger argues that the Court has been
inattentive to the ways in which press freedom may threaten, rather
than enhance, the democratic process, the very value the autonomy
model says press freedom is designed to promote. Bollinger notes that
this threat can develop in many ways: the press can exclude important
points of view from public debate, it can distort knowledge of public
issues through misrepresentation, and it can promote simple-minded
over serious discussion of ideas (pp. 26-27). Bollinger finds it "astonishing" that the Court almost never seriously addresses these concerns
(p. 34). Indeed, in many cases, the Court "seems to have gone out of
its way - to the brink of misrepresentation - to ignore the risk that
the press can become a threat to democracy rather than its servant"
(p. 34). As an illustration, Bollinger offers Sullivan itself, in which the
Court treated the state's interest in restricting libelous utterances as
deriving entirely from the individual's interest in reputation and ignored the "other strong social concerns about the quality of public
discussion" (p. 35). The Court failed, for example, to consider the
important public interests in preventing the distortion of political debate by false statements of fact and in preventing capable individuals
from being deterred from entering political life because of a fear that
they will be subjected to false statements about their character or
conduct.
It is puzzling that Bollinger emphasizes these particular costs of an
autonomous press, for they focus less on the actual costs of press freedom than on the failure of the Court to offer a full account of those
costs. The actual costs are, of course, much broader in scope and
much greater in magnitude than those Bollinger identifies. Consider,
for starters, the Pentagon Papers case14 and Nebraska Press Assn. v.
13. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
14. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (invalidating an injunction
designed to protect the national security).
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Stuart. 15 What really interests Bollinger is not the costs of an autonomous press, but what he sees as the Court's systematic undervaluation
of those costs.
Moreover, although such undervaluation may exist, Bollinger
overstates his case. The Court in Cox Broadcasting did not trivialize
the harm to the victim. Rather, it argued that whether or not that
harm might otherwise be sufficient to justify a restraint on publication,
the state cannot carry its burden of justification unless, at the very
least, it takes the harm sufficiently seriously itself to prevent its own
officers from carelessly or casually disclosing the information to the
public. This was a sensible way for the Court to test the depth of the
state's commitment. The Court's position was not that a limited disclosure of the information by officers of the state negates the harm of a
widespread dissemination by the press. It was, rather, that the state
should not be allowed to punish the publication of truthful information without a very strong justification, and that the state impeaches
the strength of its own case when it fails to take reasonable precautions
against such disclosure. This is a familiar and a sound principle of
constitutional law, and it is not in any way peculiar to Cox
Broadcasting.
Although Bollinger is also right in noting that the Court rarely
considers the potentially adverse effects of some forms of press freedom on the quality of public debate, he again overstates his point.
Whether the Court should empower the government to restrict expression that arguably undermines the democratic process turns in part on
how far back the Court should delve into first principles. It may be
that some propositions should be taken as given. Is it acceptable
under the First Amendment, for example, for the government to suppress speech that calls for government suppression of speech? Is it
acceptable under the Fir&t Amendment for the government to censor
Images of a Free Press because it advocates restrictions on press
freedom?
I do not mean to suggest that Bollinger's observation is without
merit. To the contrary, it is perfectly legitimate for the Court to consider the argument that certain forms of press freedom may undermine
the democratic process. But in considering such claims, the Court
should apply the same standards it applies to any other justification for
suppressing expression. There is nothing ironic or self-contradictory
in protecting speech that might at some time in the future have potentially undesirable effects on the "quality" of political discourse.
For the most part, it seems to me that what the Court does in these
cases is nothing different than what it does throughout its First
Amendment jurisprudence - it consistently resists the temptation to
15. 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating an order designed to protect the administration of
justice).

May 1992]

Imagining a Free Press

1251

permit speech to be suppressed or regulated because of speculative or
overblown claims about its potentially deleterious consequences. As
Bollinger has so eloquently observed in other contexts, that is one of
the great strengths of our free speech tradition. 16

III
The third step in Dean Bollinger's analysis consists of an effort to
explain why the Court systematically understates the costs of an autonomous press. At the outset, Bollinger briefly offers two very tentative explanations. First, having made up its mind to protect the press,
the Court then succumbs to the all too human tendency to " 'argue
sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements
of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion' " to justify its results.17 This rings true. Second, the Court may have a kind of "pathological fear . . . of confronting the possibility . . . that the problems
with the press may originate with the people" (p. 39), a possibility that
would require the Court to entertain a highly paternalistic view of the
public in public debate. Bollinger suggests that it may be easier for the
Court to embrace "a romantic view of the public and the press" than
"to address ... the potentially harmful impact of speech on the quality
of democratic decision making" (p. 39). There may be something to
this, but I suspect that this theory is dominated by Bollinger's first
explanation, which applies across all areas of constitutional law~ as
does the underlying phenomenon that Bollinger seeks to explain less than candid opinions.
Bollinger then offers a third explanation, one that interests him
more and derives from a more subtle understanding of the Court and a
more refined vision of press autonomy. Bollinger observes that the
Court performs a deeply educative role in society and affects, through
its opinions, the values and images citizens hold (pp. 41-42). In this
way, the Court helps to develop a dominant conception of the role of
the press and a consensus about the meaning of a "good" press. Bollinger asserts that the Court, beginning with Sullivan, has consistently
articulated a powerful image of the press and its relation to the government and the public, an image in which the press "performs a vital
role in helping . . . to reduce the risks of official incompetence and
abuse, to convey information about the affairs of government, and to
serve as a forum for citizens to communicate among themselves" (p.
44). Within this image, the Court portrays the press "as playing a
noble, even heroic, social and political role" and suffuses this image
"with ethical content: journalists should focus their attention on the
16. See LEE c. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
17. P. 38 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 47 (R.B. McCallum ed., Basil
Blackwell 1946) (1859)).
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political issues of the day, speak the truth about official conduct, expose errors and abuse, represent the opinions of different groups, and,
of course, avoid lies and misrepresentations" (p. 44). The Court defines the stakes "in very high terms indeed: a good press is a necessary
condition of a good democracy," for it "stands as the guardian and
agent of the political rights of the people" and "determines the quality
of public debate" (p. 44). Bollinger contends that the Court, by articulating and reinforcing this image, directly affects the world and creates
pressure on the press to conform to certain norms of quality
journalism.
Although conceding that it is difficult to measure the extent to
which the Court's articulation of this image actually affects the press,
Bollinger maintains that such influence exists and that it is significant
(p. 47). To support this conclusion, Bollinger observes that the press
depends on the Court for its rights and so remains "continuously conscious of the importance of having the Court ready to stand between it
and the next mood of political repression" (p. 48). The press therefore
has a "compelling self-interest in meeting the Court's expectations
about its role in society" (p. 49). Moreover, because the Court influences public opinion, the press, which must attend to such opinion, is
further affected by the Court's image of its role (p. 49).
In Bollinger's view, much that seems strange about the autonomy
model - including what be sees as the Court's systematic undervaluation of the costs of press freedom - can be understood as part of the
Court's effort to shape the press. The Court conceives of a free press
as independent, unafraid, and capable of exposing society's most fundamental shortcomings. There are enormous pressures against the realization of such a vision, however, for the "costs of exposing official
corruption or of communicating unpleasant truths ... are often great;
the simpler, more lucrative path is to provide simplicities and entertainment" (p. 56). It is easy, in other words, "to perform badly" (p.
56). This explains why the Court conceives of itself as an advocate for
the press and why it understates the costs of press freedom. In a world
in which powerful constraints threaten to stifle an aggressive and independent press, the Court's voice must be forceful and its defense of
the press must be bold. Moreover, the extreme protection the Court
gives the press may serve as a "metaphor for an intellectual style," for
to "deny state regulation of the press, to declare it 'unaccountable' to
official authority, is to emphasize its intellectual independence" (p.
57). Bollinger concludes that "the reasons for overprotection of the
press are not so much the ones given by New York Times v. Sullivan that it is necessary because the government cannot be trusted, because
human mistakes are inevitable, or because fear of litigation leads to
timidity - but the idea that the removal of a superior, supervising
authority contributes to the creation of a spirit of intellectual independence" (p. 57). Thus, as the Court goes about its everyday business of
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deciding cases, it is "continually creating images of ... American journalism" (p. 61 ), and those images directly and indirectly shape the
press and the public's expectations of what a good press should be.
The underlying structure of Bollinger's argument is now clear. He
maintains that the Court systematically understates the costs of press
freedom. He then explains this phenomenon by offering his image of
the Court as educator. As I have already indicated, however, it is not
at all clear that the Court acts any differently in the press context than
it does in most others. Indeed, so far as I can tell, the Court does not
systematically undervalue the costs of an autonomous press any more
than it systematically undervalued the costs of the exclusionary rule in
the 1960s, the right of privacy in the 1970s, or the constitutional prohibition of affirmative action in the 1980s. In these as in other contexts, Bollinger's first explanation for the Court's behavior is, for me,
the clincher: the Court undervalues competing interests because it is
easier to write opinions that way.
Having said this, I hasten to add that I do not think that Bollinger
needs to prove that the Court acts in an unusual manner in the press
context to justify putting forth his theory of the Court as educator. To
the contrary, his description of the Court's dialogue with the press and
the public is an insightful and even inspiring conception of the Court's
role in our constitutional system, and this is so whether or not it is
uniquely tied to the Court's opinions about freedom of the press. But
is it sound?
Like Bollinger, I would like to believe that the Court helps shape
our images of the press and the police, our teachers and our wardens,
our politicians and ourselves. I would like to believe that the Court
caft appeal to our better instincts, lift our spirits and set fire to our
aspirations. I would like to believe that it can inspire us to be more
careful reporters, more responsible parents, and more tolerant citizens.
Moreover, like Bollinger, I do believe it. Granted, most citizens never
see, let alone read, a judicial opinion. Nonetheless, what the Court
does and says seeps into the public consciousness, and it certainly affects those with a legal stake in the decisions. There are, of course,
those who question whether the Court has any such effect. 18 Like Bollinger, however, I am not persuaded by their criticisms and, quite
frankly, I don't wish to be.
But there is a deeper problem. For although I agree with Bollinger
that the Court can educate the press and the public through the
images it generates in its opinions, I fear that Bollinger credits the
Court with too much vision and too much subtlety. His image of the
Court may be every bit as "romantic" as the Court's image of the
press. The reasons offered in Sullivan for its fervent protection of the
18. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Stephen L. Carter. - Ed.).
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press may not be the most exhilarating or philosophical, but they are
sensible, pragmatic, and compelling. Moreover, they are the reasons
that actually motivated the Court. Bollinger's problem is that he
thinks the Court is as wise as he is. It is not.

IV
The fourth step in Dean Bollinger's analysis is his observation that,
despite the dominance of the central image, we do not in fact have an
autonomous press. To the contrary, much of this century has seen
extensive government regulation of broadcasting. What Bollinger
finds striking is that, despite this fact, we have clung tenaciously to the
central image. "[P]sychologically," we have failed to acknowledge
that "the broadcast media are highly regulated and that they are an
integral part of the American 'press' " (p. 62).
Bollinger notes that the Court has provided the most forceful defense of broadcast regulation and that its decisions have both shaped
and defined that experience. Moreover, in defending broadcast regulation the Court has offered nothing less "than a complete conceptual
reordering of the relationships between the government, the press, and
the public that was established with New York Times v. Sullivan" (p.
66). The pivotal decision was, of course, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 19 which was to broadcast regulation what Sullivan was to the
principle of journalistic autonomy.
In Red Lion, the Court reaffirmed the traditional scarcity rationale
for broadcast regulation20 and went on to observe that, in the broadcast context, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount."21 Indeed, there "is nothing
in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." 22 Bollinger
notes that the "most striking feature" of Red Lion was "the Court's
virtual celebration of public regulation" (p. 71). To read Red Lion is
"to step into another world, one that encompasses a dramatically different way of thinking about the press and about the role of public
regulation" (p. 72). Red Lion "reads like a tract that treats the press
as the most serious threat to the ultimate First Amendment goal, the
creation of an intelligent and informed democratic electorate" (p. 72).
In "the triumvirate of parties that inhabit this universe, the public
19. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
20. The Court first enunciated this rationale in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
21. 395 U.S. at 390.
22. 395 U.S. at 389.
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stands at the top and broadcasters at the bottom," while the government, "in the middle, executes the will of the people to insure that
broadcasters provide adequate service to the realm of public debate"
(p. 73). Thus, contrary to popular belief, we have never had a modem
press largely free of government control. Rather, we have had, and
continue to have, a dual system in which only one branch of the press
is autonomous.

v
Dean Bollinger begins the fifth stage of his analysis by observing
that this dual system is today undergoing extensive reevaluation (p.
86). With the abandonment of the scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation, the central question has become whether the press should be
made unitary and, if so, which model should prevail. Bollinger notes
that the weight of opinion seems to have moved toward adopting the
autonomous press model for the press as a whole (p. 86). Conceding
that this model has worked reasonably well in the dual system we have
had until now, Bollinger argues that the autonomous press model
would not serve as well if the electronic media were permitted to operate under its principles, too.
Bollinger observes that, for most of its history, broadcast regulation has been treated as a largely uncontroversial and isolated phenomenon, so distinct from the rest of the press that it has seemed to
have little impact beyond its own borders (p. 90). Viewed in that light,
the extension of the autonomous press model to broadcasting would
not seem likely to have any significant consequences for the print media. Bollinger argues, however, that it is not that simple, for "[t]he
relationship between the electronic media and its treatment and the
print media and its treatment has been subtle, shifting, and reciprocal"
(p. 93). In fact, the "broadcast experience has not been simply a marginal enterprise" (p. 85), for as broadcasting has undergone continuing
experimentation with public regulation, print journalism has lived
under the constant threat that such regulation will become the dominant approach for the future. As a result, the broadcast experience
"has exerted a profound influence over . . . the behavior of . . . the
'autonomous' print media" (p. 85), and the values "of fairness and
balance in journalism" may continually have been reinforced in the
print media by their "very real - and looming - regulatory presence
in the broadcast media context" (p. 96). Bollinger warns that, viewed
from this perspective, a decision to eliminate broadcast regulation
could indirectly but significantly undermine the commitment to such
values throughout the press (pp. 96-99).
Building upon his earlier work, 23 Bollinger maintains that the ex23. Bollinger, supra note 2.
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isting dual system in fact makes good sense in terms of both public
policy and First Amendment theory because there are compelling reasons for being both receptive to and wary of regulation. The Court
should not be forced into an "all-or-nothing" position, for we can have
the "best of both worlds" (p. 110).
In defending his theory of partial regulation, Bollinger contends
that access regulation, exemplified by the fairness doctrine, both responds to constitutional traditions and cuts against them (p. 110). On
the one hand, such regulation helps realize First Amendment. goals by
neutralizing disparities that impede the proper functioning of the marketplace of ideas and by equalizing opportunities to command an audience and to mobilize public opinion. Bollinger argues that these are
important goals because unrestrained private interests can hamper the
free exchange of ideas as severely as government censors. Access regulation directly addresses this concern by limiting the capacity of private power centers to control - and to distort - public debate.
On the other hand, Bollinger recognizes that access regulation constitutes a significant departure from our traditional constitutional
norms concerning the need to maintain a distance between the government and the press. Such regulation can have at least three adverse
consequences. First, it can chill journalistic motivation to address
controversial issues of public importance. Second, it can necessitate
the establishment of an administrative machinery that can be abused
to force the press into an official line. Third, it can open the door to
ever more oppressive press restrictions (pp. 111-13).
Because he sees access regulation as both desirable and dangerous,
Bollinger concludes that a dual system of partial regulation offers important advantages over either complete regulation or complete
nonregulation. Bollinger thus contends that the Court, by accepting
the existing system of partial regulation, "has imposed a compromise,
not based on notions of expedience but on a reasoned, principled, accommodation of competing First Amendment values" (p. 116). This
system permits both "experimentation and the manifestation of ambivalence," both of which are healthy (p. 117). Bollinger emphatically
rejects the claim that a system manifesting such ambivalence violates
the virtue of consistency or impermissibly discriminates against the
broadcast media. In his view, such differential treatment is acceptable
because it "reflects no animus toward broadcasters" (p. 117) and because a concern with consistency in this context is "unduly fastidious"
(p. 118). Bollinger warns that we must not allow ourselves to "be intellectually crippled by the charge of inconsistency" (p. 118).
I have puzzled over Bollinger's theory of partial regulation ever
since he first articulated it fifteen years ago. Quite frankly, I have
never managed to persuade myself that it is persuasive. Call me "unduly fastidious" but, in my judgment, the argument is "intellectually
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crippled" by its failure to come to grips with the charge of
inconsistency.
Bollinger argues that broadcast regulation does not reflect any "animus towards broadcasters." It is probably true that there was no
such animus when Congress first enacted broadcast regulation, for
there were few if any broadcasters and, in any event, the initial regulators clearly accepted the scarcity rationale as a compelling reason for
regulation. With the universal abandonment of the scarcity rationale,
however, the decision to retain broadcast regulation may well be
tainted by "animus," if animus is generously defined. The retention of
broadcast regulation serves at least two quite suspect purposes - it
protects the commercial interests of the competing media, and it renders broadcasters vulnerable to the oversight and possible manipulation of federal regulators and politicians. I do not know precisely
what Bollinger means by animus in this context, but it is difficult to
ignore these two problematic influences in the decision to continue
broadcast regulation long after the abandonment of its initiaj
rationale.
Moreover, and more important, the presence or absence of animus
hardly ends the inquiry. Otherwise, virtually all of our equal protection and much of our First Amendment jurisprudence would go by the
boards. The constitutional concern with equal treatment is about
more than merely preventing government discrimination based on animus. 24 This is not to say, however, that the government can never
treat different means of communication differently. To the contrary,
the Court has "long recognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems."25 It is not unconstitutional, for example, for the government to permit leafleting but not
loudspeakers in an airport terminal. But such differential treatment
must be based upon real differences in the methods of communication,
and those differences must be directly relevant to the interests the government seeks to further. With the abandonment of the scarcity rationale for treating the electronic media differently from the print
media, we are left with no relevant difference between these two means
of communication that would justify subjecting one, but not the other,
to regulation. This is hardly an "unduly fastidious" concern with consistency. It is rather the very essence of the fundamental precept that
the government may not treat similarly situated individuals - or institutions - differently.
Bollinger's "best of both worlds" argument is superficially quite
seductive. It is fundamentally incompatible, however, with the basic
24. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46
(1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189 (1983).
25. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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premises of our First Amendment jurisprudence. To say that there are
competing approaches to a problem and that each has certain advantages and disadvantages is merely to say that competing interests are
at stake. That is always the case in constitutional adjudication. To
say that there is no reason to deny ourselves the best of both worlds by
accommodating the competing interests is merely to say that we
should engage in ad hoc, open-ended balancing, a form of analysis that
has long been rejected in First Amendment doctrine. Restrictions on
political expression that significantly and discriminatorily limit journalistic freedom are and should be presumptively unconstitutional. To
sustain such restrictions, the government must bear a heavy burden of
justification. It is no answer to say: "We'll compromise by inflicting
the restrictions on only some speakers." We have never permitted
such experimentation, such self-indulgence of our "ambivalence,"
when considering the constitutionality of significant and discriminatory restrictions on free expression. There is no reason to begin here.
In fact, Bollinger's conclusion that we should permit the government to regulate the electronic but not the print media is nothing short
of arbitrary. Indeed, in his earlier work Bollinger expressly asserted
that his theory of "partial regulation could be applied to any portion
of the media" and that the government could decide at will "to shift
from regulation of broadcasting to regulation of newspapers" (p. 120).
In Images of a Free Press, however, Bollinger retracts that view - he
now believes that it would be unconstitutional to reverse the existing
situation. In other words, "partial regulation" for now and ever more
means regulation only of the "newer (electronic) media" (p. 120). But
why? Without the scarcity rationale, there is simply no legitimate reason to impose the burdens of regulation on broadcast rather than on
print journalism.
That, however, is only the tip of the problem. Bollinger considers
the regulatory choice to be between the broadcast and print media.
But if we are to live in the "best" of all worlds, why isn't our choice
much broader? Why can't we choose to regulate all of the press, but
not speech? Why can't we choose to regulate only cable television?
Only broadcast television? Only magazines? Everything but
magazines? Everything but cable? The opportunities to design the
best of all worlds are virtually without limit. Would any of these
choices violate the First Amendment? If so, which ones, and why? In
Bollinger's realm of arbitrary choices to achieve the best of all worlds,
there is not only "no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press," there is no law. Indeed, it is revealing that in discussing Red
Lion Bollinger enthusiastically applauds the Court for acting "as if it
were reviewing a decision of an ordinary administrative agency" (p.
73). But that hardly seems the appropriate judicial stance for deciding
whether the government may extensively regulate some, but not other,
elements of the press.
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One might argue that the decision to regulate broadcast but not
print journalism makes sense even after the abandonment of the scarcity rationale because partial regulation has worked well in the past
and has not appreciably impaired the freedom of the regulated media.
On this view, the otherwise arbitrary decision to regulate the broadcast but not the print media is defensible because such differential
treatment serves important societal interests at no real sacrifice of the
rights of those who are subjected to regulation. But even if this argument is sensible in theory, it is implausible in fact. As the Court made
clear in its unanimous decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 26 the type of access regulation that Bollinger endorses for the
broadcast press significantly restricts journalistic freedom. Such regulation seriously limits the freedom of broadcasters relative to that of
print journalists. In light of Tornillo, such regulations can hardly be
dismissed as de minimis. Even a cursory glance at the differences between broadcast and print journalism reveals the impact of government regulation. By comparison with the unregulated media,
broadcasting is bland, cautious, and studiously nonpolitical. Broadcasters do not endorse political candidates and they do not stake out
controversial positions on issues of public importance. There can be
no doubt that these differences are due in part to the effects of regulation. Directly and indirectly, government regulation makes broadcasters less willing to participate vigorously in public debate. Indeed,
recognizing that the fairness doctrine may chill more speech than it
fosters, even the FCC now calls for a return to the free market system
for broadcasting.27 Although Bollinger challenges this conclusion, his
responses are insufficient to justify the discriminatory imposition of
significant restrictions on only some members of the press (pp. 12028).
One might argue further, I suppose, that the "best of both worlds"
approach is uniquely appropriate in this context because there are
First Amendment interests on both sides of the balance. As Bollinger
observes, journalistic autonomy has certain advantages for the system
of free expression, as does government regulation. To embrace either
"extreme" may produce less effective public debate than a best of both
worlds approach and thus frustrate the underlying goals of the First
Amendment. In such circumstances, we are faced less with a conflict
of competing interests than with a need to meld two competing models
to produce the best possible First Amendment result. But this proves
too much. On this view of constitutional law, the government could
justify allowing school prayer for students who want to pray on the
theory that such a policy accommodates the competing free exercise
26. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a right-of-reply statute as applied to print media).
27. Federal Communications Commission, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418 (1985).
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and establishment interests, thus giving us the best of both worlds.
Similarly, the government could justify racial segregation in at least
some of our public schools on the plea that such a policy accommodates the competing constitutional interests in freedom of association
and racial equality, thus giving us the best of both worlds. And, on
this view, the government could justify waiving the protections of New
York Times v. Sullivan in libel actions brought by black or other minority political candidates on the plea that such a policy accommodates the competing constitutional interests in free expression and in
expanding the opportunities for minority candidates, again giving us
the best of both worlds.
I could go on, but the point is clear. The "best of both worlds"
argument is an invitation to constitutional disaster. It cannot redeem
a departure from the essential First Amendment principle that the
government may not selectively impose significant restrictions on the
political speech of some speakers, but not others, in the absence of an
important difference between the speakers that directly furthers a substantial governmental interest.
Finally, I should note that even if Bollinger's partial regulation
theory were otherwise sound, it is nonetheless seriously underinclusive
as an effective response to many of the problems that plague our political discourse today. The theory of partial regulation was the product
of thinking about the fairness doctrine and similar forms of access regulation to address one particular concern - the underrepresentation
of unconventional points of view in the mass media. But the theory is
wholly inadequate to deal with a host of equally important concerns,
many of which certainly trouble Bollinger, such as the tendency of the
media to treat political campaigns as sporting events, to trivialize public discussion, and to sensationalize private facts about political candidates, all to the detriment of our political process. Any serious effort
to address the failures of the press today must come to grips with these
concerns, as well as with the issue of access. The theory of partial
regulation does not reach these issues and would not enable us to confront them effectively.

VI
The final step in Dean Bollinger's analysis calls for a "new image"
of the idea of freedom of the press (p. 133). Under the "primitive"
image of Sullivan, "the goal of press freedom [was] viewed as the creation of a vast space for 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' public
discussion," and it was "assumed that the role of the Supreme Court is
to stand guard against government intervention, permitting it only
when the public interest counters with an overwhelming competing
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interest to that of free and open debate." 28 Bollinger maintains that
this approach is "insensitive to problems affecting the quality of public
discussion that are posed by a laissez-faire system of modern mass media" (p. 133) and that before "we can be clearheaded in thinking about
the great issues involving the press and the quality of public debate"
we must develop "a new theoretical perspective" (p. 136).
In articulating this new perspective, Bollinger begins with the
FCC's call for the abandonment of the fairness doctrine. In its 1985
report, the FCC reasoned that, with the proliferation of broadcast outlets and the emergence of new forms of print media, the fear of concentration that gave rise to government regulation was no longer
reasonable (p. 136). Bollinger argues that this conclusion was premised on the faulty assumption "that the only acceptable rationale for
public regulation must stem from some form of market failure" (p.
137). Bollinger identifies two now familiar objections to this assumption. First, because "the market for freedom of the press necessarily
exists within the larger context of a market for goods and services ...
[c]itizens arrive at the system of press freedom with vast inequalities of
wealth and, therefore, with very different abilities to participate effectively in public debate" (p. 137). Second, because "there 'is no necessary, or even probabilistic, relationship between making a profit (or
allocating resources efficiently) and supplying the electorate with the
information they need to make free and intelligent choices about government policy,'" there is a serious "conflict between the interests of
those who manage for-profit media institutions and the interests of the
democratic society in ensuring that citizens are supplied the information and ideas they ought to have." 29
In Bollinger's view, these criticisms, though powerful, "do not provide as full and clear a picture as we need to determine the appropriate
role of the state in mediating the deficiencies of a free press in the
context of a free market system" (p. 138). Rather, they "represent
only an intermediate step toward a deeper, more fundamental understanding" (p. 138). Bollinger explains that we "must address the nature of our own behavior in the discussion of public questions" and
that we must "be concerned about the character of our demands in the
market" (p. 139). Indeed, we "have good reasons to be wary of ourselves, and we should fear not just the failures of the market system
but our own failures of intellect," for a "democratic society, like an
individual, should strive to remain conscious of the biases that skew,
distort, and corrupt its own thinking about public issues" (p. 139).
Thus, "even in a world in which the press is entirely free and open to
all voices, with a perfect market in that sense, human nature would
still see to it that quality public debate and decision making would not
28. P. 133 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
29. P. 137 (quoting Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987)).
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rise naturally to the surface but would, in all probability, need the
buoyant support of some form of collective action by citizens, involving public institutions" (p. 139). As an example, Bollinger cites our
criminal justice system, in which "we go to great lengths to ensure the
decision-making process is purified of biases, and we recognize that an
entirely laissez-faire system is likely to produce great injustice" (p.
140). Bollinger speculates that we accept the extraordinary constraints in this context, exemplified by the rules of evidence, "because
we understand that the stakes are so high for the individual defendant" (p. 140). He maintains that we should think the same way about
democracy. Indeed, it "should be considered a sign of high intellectual development when a society is able to take steps to correct those
problems within itself that interfere with quality decision making" (p.
140).
Although conceding that the mass media may "give viewers and
readers what they 'want,' or demand, through the expression of their
preferences in the marketplace," Bollinger finds it nonetheless imaginable "that we - the same 'we' that issue our marketplace votes for
what we get - might be very concerned about how we are behaving,
about what choices we are making, in that system" (p. 141). Accordingly, we may "decide together, through public regulation, that we
would like to alter or modify the demands we find ourselves making in
that market context," for we may "recognize that if we are left to
choose on our own whether and how to inform ourselves, too many
will neglect to undertake the burdens of self-education, choosing instead to pursue more pleasant things" (p. 141).
Bollinger argues that "it would be a more advanced society, a more
advanced democratic society, that could act to correct deficiencies
arising out of the ... citizens themselves" (pp. 141-42). He maintains
that such regulation should not be condemned as elitist or paternalistic, for it "is not paternalism when a majority of a society recognizes
that its own intellectual limitations call for some institutional or structural correctives" (p. 144). Bollinger concludes that an approach to
government regulation stemming from a "self-conscious awareness" of
our own frailties and biases in order to promote a higher level of public discussion and decisionmaking would "be a great and important
advance in the history of press freedom" (pp. 144-45).
It is in his articulation of this approach that Bollinger offers his
most important contribution. His vision of freedom of the press and
of its relation to public institutions and to the character of the American people represents a significant step forward. By emphasizing the
need to address failings in our national character, this approach
presents a vision of government intervention that is designed to improve the press, the political process, and the people.
Bollinger's analogy to the criminal justice system is especially pow-
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erful. As Bollinger notes, we exclude all sorts of evidence from the
consideration of the jury in its decision of important questions of fact
(p. 140). We do this for many reasons. Sometimes, as in the context
of the attorney-client privilege, we exclude relevant evidence because
its probative value is outweighed by the harm that its admission would
cause to extrajudicial interests, such as the confidentiality of the privileged relationship. In other situations, we exclude evidence because
we fear that jurors will exaggerate its probative value. We generally
exclude evidence of prior convictions of criminal defendants, for example, because, in the jargon of the law of evidence, the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue
prejudice to the defendant. In such circumstances, we conclude that
jurors are more likely to reach a fair and accurate result if they are
denied access to the evidence completely. Bollinger asks us to consider extending this approach to the democratic system.
Consider the following extension of the analogy. Traditionally, the
press did not report information about the private sexual conduct of
political candidates. In exercising such discretion, the press acted like
a judge in a criminal trial, preventing the people - the jurors - from
learning information that arguably would distort their judgment and
distract their attention from more important matters. Today, however, as part of a general breakdown of journalistic standards, the
press, driven by rampant commercialism, routinely sensationalizes
such information to the (arguable) detriment of the political process.
In its defense, the press argues that it would be irresponsible not to
report such information, pointing to polls indicating that perhaps fifteen percent of the public would not vote for a candidate who engaged
in such activity. But on the same theory, the press presumably would
have to argue that because seven percent of the public would not vote
for a candidate who engaged in oral sex with his spouse, it must disclose that information, too. Similarly, because five percent of the people would not vote for a candidate who did not shower or change his
socks everyday, or wear pajamas to bed, the press would have to regard those facts, too, as appropriate for public disclosure. There must
be some limit, h9wever, and this limit must be designed not only to
respect the legitimate privacy interests of candidates, but also to reflect
our right, as a society, to decide that some matters simply should not
play a significant role in our political process, even if some of our fellow citizens disagree. And our right to make such a decision should
be strongest when, as in the trial context, the information has a greater
potential to distract and distort than to inform our better judgment.
As in the trial context, we should be able to protect the political pro:.
cess against our own failures of judgment.
Bollinger has offered us an innovative and powerful new image of
freedom of the press. It merits serious consideration. In that vein, I
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would like to venture a few tentative observations. First, although
Bollinger does not seem to note this himself, his new vision of freedom
of the press is much broader than his theory of partial regulation. It
offers no justification for continued discrimination against the broadcast press. It does, however, provide a strong rationale for enabling
the government to reach a much broader range of concerns than those
addressed by mere access regulation. It offers a more principled and
less arbitrary foundation on which to build a bolder and more innovative theory of government regulation of the press.
Second, Bollinger maintains that his new approach is neither paternalistic nor elitist. This is at least questionable. The mere fact that
"a majority of us" agrees to enact restrictions on what the press may
report does not mean that the restrictions are not elitist or paternalistic. Bollinger seems to assume that there is no paternalism in these
circumstances because those supporting the restrictions do so in recognition of their own frailties. They are, in effect, tying their own hands
by denying themselves access to information they fear they themselves
might otherwise abuse. In truth, however, many if not most of those
who would support such restrictions probably think themselves perfectly capable of handling the information at issue. It is the "others"
they worry about. In this sense, at least, such restrictions cannot escape the taint of paternalism. Moreover, the minority of citizens who
are prevented from obtaining information they consider useful in making their own political decisions are certainly the victims of elitism
insofar as the "majority" finds that judgment inappropriate. It does
not further the analysis to insist that such regulations are not elitist or
paternalistic. At least in a subtle way, they are. The important - and
difficult - task is to determine when a "majority of us" has the right,
if ever, to decide that certain information about political candidates is
not to play a role in political debate, even though "a minority of us"
disagrees.
Third, although Bollinger puts forth his new image with considerable conviction, in the end he adopts a tentative stance, noting that it is
uncertain whether our society is sufficiently "advanced" to embrace
this theory, and that the essential "question is whether the government
can be trusted with the power to intervene into the field of public debate" (p. 142). Bollinger is wise to recognize the risks in his approach
and to doubt whether the government "can be trusted" to implement
it. There is some irony in this, of course, for at its very core Images of
a Free Press directly challenges Sullivan's "central image" by attacking Sullivan's distrust of government regulation of the press.
On the other hand, although there may be some tension in Bollinger's ultimate distrust of government, it is also true that he is prepared
seriously to consider whether we should grant government a good deal
more discretion than we have in the past. For those who, like myself,
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generally accept Sullivan's central image, this is a disquieting prospect.
I am convinced by Bollinger and others, 30 however, that it is time to
ask some hard questions about our political process. If we are unwilling to trust government to regulate the press, we must be content to
leave the critical decisions to the press. But it is no longer clear to me
that a society dedicated to maintaining an effective, fair, and open
political process should delegate the decision of such fundamental
questions concerning the structure and nature of our political discourse to the unelected, unrepresentative members of the private press.
It is one thing to guarantee and protect freedom of speech and of the
press. It is at least arguably another thing entirely to cede to the press
the essentially unrestrained authority to determine the basic ground
rules of our democratic process. Viewed in that light, the critical question is not whether we should trust the government to regulate the
press, but whether we should trust the press to define our political
process. We must understand that the choice that confronts us is
more subtle and more difficult than whether we want the government
to control the press. It is a choice between two competing power centers - one subject to political control, the other controlled increasingly by the market. That, in any event, is the choice and the
challenge that Bollinger offers us in Images of a Free Press.
Throughout this work, Bollinger refers admiringly to a 1947 report
on the condition of press freedom in the United States. 31 This report,
which was the work of a prestigious commission chaired by Robert M.
Hutchins, then Chancellor of the University of Chicago, concluded
that the press "is not meeting the needs of our society."32 Although
the Commission stopped short of calling for full-scale government regulation, it emphasized that freedom of the press must be understood as
a "conditional right" extended by the people to the press; it is not a
law of nature, but a means of securing the advantages that "an autonomous press can provide a democratic society." 33 We have granted the
press extraordinary protection for extraordinary reasons - reasons
that go to the very core of our self-governing process. On this view,
freedom of the press is a means to an end, and a press that fails to
serve the ends for which it is free may lose that freedom. As the
Hutchins Commission observed, no "democracy . . . will indefinitely
tolerate concentrations of private power irresponsible and strong
enough to thwart the aspirations of the people."34
It is time "to establish a modern sequel to the Hutchins commis30.
31.
(1947).
32.
33.
34.

See Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U.
See CoMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE
Id. at 68.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 80.

CHI. L. REv. 255 (1992); Fiss,

supra note 29.
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sion" (p. 135) in order to study the performance of the press today and
to consider more fully the complex and important questions posed in
Images of a Free Press. I can think of no more thoughtful or more
knowledgeable person to chair that commission than Lee Bollinger.

